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Fierce policy disputes are inevitable whenever two basic, widely-ac-
cepted principles intersect in a situation where one must prevail and the
other give way. In the maritime field, these disputes occur whenever a
nation-state is forced to choose between promoting free and open trade in
maritime services or protecting its domestic merchant marine.
The clash of these policies has generated vigorous debates in the
United States on a wide variety of maritime issues (e.g., cargo preference
requirements, operating and construction differential subsidies, vessel
construction loan guarantee programs and whether to retaliate against
foreign countries' attempts to reserve import and export trades for their
merchant marines). In one area, however, the advocates of a strong do-
mestic merchant marine have routed the forces of free trade by reserving
domestic maritime trades for national maritime fleets. The right of a
nation to exclude foreign vessels from its domestic maritime trades is
accepted without question in the international community; and most
coastal nations, including the United States, have adopted cabotage laws
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; Executive Director,
Center for International Trade Policy. Research for this article was made possible by a Ross McCol-
lum Summer Research Grant.
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to enforce that right.' The United States' maritime cabotage laws are
contained in Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 19202 - com-
monly referred to as the Jones Act.3
This article will challenge neither the United States' legal right to
adopt cabotage laws, nor the Congressional choice to protect the United
States merchant marine through the enactment of the Jones Act. In-
stead, this article analyzes recent Jones Act rulings, opinions and deci-
sions4 on the so-called "continuity of the voyage" issue (Le., whether the
Act applies to the transportation of cargoes between two United States
points if they are manufactured or processed at a foreign intermediate
point).
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, by placing undue empha-
sis on the changes in the physical composition of merchandise during
foreign processing operations and by ignoring more relevant criteria, the
United States Customs Service currently administers the Jones Act in a
manner that bears no reasonable or consistent relationship to the pur-
poses of the Act, and unduly restricts international trade. Pursuant to
these rulings, some industries (e.g., the oil industry) freely substitute for-
eign flag vessels for competing (but higher-cost) United States coastwise-
qualified vessels operating in nearby domestic routes, by engaging in min-
imal processing operations at a foreign point virtually enroute between
their United States origin and destination points.5 At the same time,
I Two concepts that will be discussed in greater detail should be mentioned at this point. First,
the maritime trades that are reserved under United States cabotage laws involve transportation be-
tween two United States points, directly or via a foreign point. These trades are referred to as
"coastwise" or "domestic" trades in this article. Second, the United States cabotage laws reserve
coastwise trades for only a portion of all vessels that were built in the United States or are operated
under the U.S. flag, Le., those vessels that are built without a federal subsidy and are documented as
eligible to operate in the coastwise trades (hereinafter referred to as "coastwise-qualified vessels" or
the "coastwise fleet").
2 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1989).
3 The term "Jones Act" is also used to refer to Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(46 U.S.C. § 688), which provides for recovery for the injury or death of seamen. For purposes of
this article, however, references to the "Jones Act" are limited to Section 27 of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920.
4 A number of different sources for interpretations of the Jones Act will be utilized in this
article, including the federal courts and the United States Customs Service. Customs Service deci-
sions and rulings include decisions concerning alleged violations, and prospective rulings providing
guidance as to that agency's opinion on the applicability of the Jones Act to proposed transportation
arrangements, which are issued pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §§ 4.80b, 177 (1989). The Customs Service
selects some of its interpretive rulings for publication in the weekly Customs Bulletin and Decisions
(Customs B. & Dec.) and the annual Customs Bulletin (Customs BulL). All Customs Service inter-
pretive rulings cited in this article which have not been selected for publication in either of those
publications are published in microfiche form or are available upon request from the Customs
Service.
5 For purposes of this article, the term "U.S. origin" or "U.S. destination" refers to the U.S.
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other industries (e.g., the seafood industry) that engage in substantial
processing operations at foreign points located thousands of miles from
the nearest domestic route served by a United States coastwise-qualified
vessel are denied the opportunity to use foreign-flag or United States
non-coastwise-qualified vessels serving those foreign trade routes, if it can
be anticipated that any portion of the United States origin merchandise
will return to the United States after processing.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of the U.S. Cabotage Laws
The United States became a maritime power before it became a na-
tion. The British Colonies in America were the world's leading
shipbuilders, due primarily to the proximity of suitable timber to major
port cities (although the British exercised substantial control over colo-
nial maritime operations).6 After the Revolutionary War, the United
States maritime industry prospered as a result of its lower costs, and the
status of its vessels as neutral ships during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century European wars.7
From the early days of our history as a nation, the proposition that
an adequate domestic merchant marine is essential to the defense and
commercial welfare of the United States became a basic element of our
national policy. As noted by the D.C. Circuit:
It has long been recognized that an adequate merchant marine, with U.S.-
flag ships and trained American sailors, is vital to both the national defense
and the commercial welfare of our country. We require a sound merchant
marine to protect foreign trade and to provide support for the armed forces
in times of war or national emergency. We also require a modem, efficient
shipbuilding industry capable of providing military vessels in times of
stress.8
By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, as Clipper Ships were
giving way to steamships, the United States began losing its comparative
advantage in shipbuilding, and the U.S. merchant marine began to de-
cline.9 Today, the U.S. merchant marine is not competitive in the world
port of origin or destination, rather than the ultimate inland origin or destination of the
merchandise.
6 Hutchins, THE AMERICAN MARITIME INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1789 - 1914, 130-
157 (1941); Bryant, THE SEA AND THE STATES 44 (1947).
7 Zeis, AMERICAN SHIPPING POLICY 4-5, n. 5 (1938).
8 Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see also, Marine Carriers Corporation v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert den'd 400
U.S. 1020 (1971).
9 Denison, AMERICA'S MARITIME HISTORY 85, 110-18 (1944); Fayle, A SHORT HISTORY OF
THE WORLD'S SHIPPING INDUSTRY 226 (1933).
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market due to relatively high wages and stringent safety standards in
every aspect of the industry - from shipbuilding to vessel operations to
insurance: 10 "As a result, the American shipping industry, left to its own
resources, would have all of its ships built abroad, registered under for-
eign flags, and manned by foreign seamen."11 To promote the national
policy of maintaining an adequate merchant marine in spite of its non-
competitive cost structure, Congress has adopted two basic approaches
- and in the process has created two separate fleets of United States flag
vessels.
Historically, Congress's first intervention on behalf of the United
States merchant marine was in the form of cabotage laws. Although lit-
tle assistance was required by our merchant marine while the United
States enjoyed a comparative advantage in the shipbuilding industry, af-
ter passage of the Constitution in 1789, the First Congress promptly ex-
ercised the sovereign powers of the United States to protect the United
States merchant marine fleet from foreign flag competition in its domes-
tic maritime trades. The third law passed by the new Congress imposed
a tax on foreign vessels operating in the domestic trades at a rate that, as
a practical matter, precluded them from competing with the domestic
merchant marine in those trades.1 2 In 1817, Congress expressly prohib-
ited foreign vessels from operating in the coastwise trades.
1 3
From 1817 to 1866, the U.S. maritime cabotage laws prohibited the
transportation of merchandise "from one port of the United States to
another port of the United States in a vessel belonging wholly or in part
to a subject of any foreign power." 4 In 1866, when Congress was alerted
to the possibility of evading the proscriptions of the United States cabo-
tage laws by transshipping cargoes at nearby Canadian ports, it broad-
ened the scope of the act to cover:
merchandise... at any port in the United States on the northern, north-
eastern or northwestern frontiers thereof.., laden upon any vessel belong-
ing wholly or in part to a subject or subjects of a foreign country or
countries, and... taken thence to a foreign port or place to be reladen and
reshipped to any other port in the United States on said frontiers, either by
the same or any other vessel, foreign or American, with the intent to evade
the provisions relating to the [transportation of merchandise from one port
of the United States to another port of the United States.] 15
10 See, Independent United States Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
lI Id.
12 Chapter 2, § 5 of the Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 27 (1848).
13 Chapter 31, § 4 of the Act of March 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 351 (1850).
14 Id.
15 Chapter 201, § 20 of the Act of July 18, 1866, 22 Stat. 641 (1883).
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Eventually, a hardware merchant tested the limits of the United
States cabotage laws by shipping kegs of nails from New York City to
Antwerp on a Belgian flag vessel, briefly discharging the cargo at Ant-
werp and promptly reloading it onto a British flag vessel bound for Cali-
fornia. When the cargo arrived in California, the Collector of Customs
brought a forfeiture action against the cargo owner for his violation of
the United States cabotage laws. In its decision in United States v. Two
Hundred and Fifty Kegs of Nails16 the court of appeals found the prohibi-
tions of the cabotage laws inapplicable to the situation at issue, because:
"[I]n the plain and ordinary meaning of the words, 'to transport goods
from one domestic port to another' means to carry goods in one continu-
ous voyage .... It does not mean to carry them in two distinct and
separate voyages, or in two distinct vessels .... .""
Congress promptly amended the cabotage laws in 1893 by prohibit-
ing foreign flag transportation between two U.S. ports directly or indi-
rectly "via a foreign port.""8 As the 1893 amendments have remained a
part of the United States maritime cabotage statutes through numerous
amendments, the Jones Act now provides in relevant part that:
No merchandise shall be transported by water, or by land and water, on
penalty of forfeiture of the merchandise (or a monetary amount up to the
value thereof. . ., or the actual cost of the transportation, whichever is
greater... ), between points in the United States, including Districts, Terri-
tories, and possessions thereof embraced within the coastwise laws, either
directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation, in any
other vessel than a vessel built in and documented under the laws of the
United States and owned by persons who are citizens of the United States
19
Congress cannot legislate away competition in the foreign trades of
the United States, however. Since all trading partners have similar inter-
ests in promoting their merchant marines and equal rights to have their
cargoes transported by those merchant marines, no country has the right
to reserve its import or export trades for its merchant marine. Accord-
ingly, the United States has attempted to equalize foreign and domestic
cost structures by granting various offsetting subsidies to United States
shipbuilders and vessel operators competing in foreign trades.20
16 61 F. 410 (9th Cir. 1894).
17 Id. at 411.
18 This language was added to the cabotage laws even before the court of appeals printed its
decision in the 250 Kegs of Nails case, Chapter 117 of the Act of February 15, 1893 (27 Stat. 455).
It was adopted without revision when the Jones Act was passed in 1920, and remains unchanged to
date.
19 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1989).
20 E.g., construction and operating differential subsidies pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.,
1171 etseq. (1989).
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As a result of the different legislative approaches for protecting the
United States merchant marine in the domestic and foreign trades, the
United States merchant fleet is divided into two distinct segments. One
segment consists of U.S. built vessels which were constructed without the
benefit of construction differential subsidies, and operate in the coastwise
trades without the benefit of operating differential subsidies. This seg-
ment of the fleet operates in the domestic trades of the United States
where it is insulated from competition with lower-cost foreign built ves-
sels and lower-paid foreign crews. The other segment consists of United
States built vessels which were constructed with the benefit of construc-
tion differential subsidies. 21 This segment operates in the foreign trades
of the United States, where it could not compete with lower-cost foreign
built vessels in the absence of a construction differential subsidy.
22
In fact, the segregation of the two segments of the United States
merchant marine fleet into separate domestic and foreign trades is virtu-
ally complete. As a matter of law, subsidized United States built vessels
may not be employed in the domestic trades. As a matter of economic
reality, unsubsidized United States built vessels cannot compete in the
foreign trades with lower-cost foreign vessels.23
B. The Blumenthal Case
The adoption of the 1893 amendments clearly eliminated the trans-
shipment loophole that had been recognized in 250 Kegs of Nails. Ques-
tions still remained, however, as to whether the expansion of the
cabotage laws to cover transportation between two United States points,
indirectly via a foreign point, included merchandise that was trans-
formed at a foreign intermediate processing point.
Since at least 1938, the Customs Service had publicly taken the posi-
tion that foreign processing24 will break the continuity of a voyage be-
tween two U.S. points if it creates a new and different product;25 but the
landmark decision on this question was not issued until the D.C. Circuit
rendered its decision in American Maritime Association v. Blumenthap
6
forty-one years later.
The Blumenthal case arose out of the discovery of crude oil at
21 U.S. flag operators have been allowed to register foreign-built vessels for use in the foreign
trades of the United States under certain limited circumstances that are not relevant to this issue.
22 Independent United States Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
23 Id.
24 For purposes of this article, the term "processing" includes "manufacturing" or "processing."
25 See, Treas. Dec. 79-193, 13 Customs BulL 573, 574 (1979).
26 590 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1978); cert. den'd 441 U.S. 943 (1979).
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Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska. The United States maritime
industry assumed that Alaskan North Slope crude oil would become a
lucrative source of business for the United States coastwise fleet when its
exportation was prohibited by legislation.27 The possibility that it might
be transported by foreign flag or United States non-coastwise-qualified
vessels directly to ultimate foreign destinations was eliminated as a mat-
ter of law.2" The possibility that the oil might be transported to an inter-
mediate foreign processing facility was eliminated, as a matter of
economics, by the absence of any foreign refineries enroute from Alaska
to the natural United States points of entry on the West Coast.
By the time the Alaska oil pipeline was nearing completion, how-
ever, the economic assumptions that the United States merchant marine
had relied upon changed significantly. Due to a glut of oil on the West
Coast (and environmental opposition to the construction of new oil pipe-
lines at Southern California ports), the market for North Slope oil on the
West Coast disappeared.2 9
In 1969, Amerada Hess announced that it would refine its share of
the North Slope crude oil at its St. Croix, Virgin Islands refinery before
delivering the refined products to various U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coast
locations. Since the Virgin Islands are not considered a United States
coastwise point for purposes of the Jones Act,30 Hess adopted the posi-
tion that the foreign processing would break the continuity of the voy-
ages from Alaska to ultimate United States Atlantic and Gulf Coast
destinations, thereby allowing it to use foreign-flag tankers.
31
The Shipbuilders Council (one of the plaintiffs in the Blumenthal
case) promptly requested a Customs Service 32 ruling affirming its posi-
tion that Hess's transportation would be subject to the Jones Act. As
noted in Blumenthal, the Commissioner of Customs replied by stating
that:
"[I]f the main purpose of the exportation was to have the merchandise thus
processed and if the processing was not merely incidental to an intended
transportation between American ports," then the prohibition of the Jones
Act did not apply and the transportation could be by a foreign vessel ....
[T]he Bureau of Customs ordinarily considered processing to be "substan-
tial," and thus likely to be the main purpose" of the exportation, if it
27 See, Treas. Dec. 79-193, 13 Customs BulL 573, 574 (1979).
28 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
29 Id.
30 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 21; 46 U.S.C. § 877 (1970).
31 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
32 The U.S. Customs Service has operated under several different titles at various times in its
history. For purposes of this article, the term "Customs Service" includes any previous titles or
predecessor agencies.
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"changed the merchandise physically, improved its condition, and ad-
vanced it in value, so that after processing it was a new and different
product.",
33
The Customs Service did not issue a formal ruling at that time; but
the Shipbuilders Council renewed its request for a ruling favorable to its
interests shortly before Hess's first scheduled voyage from Valdez to St.
Croix in 1977. In response, the Customs Service issued a regulation,
which now provides in relevant part that:
[M]erchandise is not transported coastwise if at an intermediate port or
place other than a coastwise point (that is at a foreign port or place, or at a
port or place in a territory or possession of the United States not subject to
the coastwise laws), it is manufactured or processed into a new and different
product, and the new and different product thereafter is transported to a
coastwise point.3 4
The day before Hess's first sailing, the American Maritime Associa-
tion (and other representatives of United States shipbuilders and seamen)
sought a temporary restraining order enjoining such transportation on
non-coastwise-qualified vessels. The district court denied the TRO, and
plaintiffs' motions for preliminary and final injunctions. 35 The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and in its opinion set out two
tests for determining whether processing at an intermediate foreign point
breaks the continuity of a voyage between a U.S. origin port and an ulti-
mate U.S. destination.
One test focuses on the physical degree of alteration of the merchan-
dise during the manufacturing or processing operation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Physical Alteration Test.") After reviewing the
evidence concerning the refining process in which crude oil was
processed into eleven different petroleum products,36 the court held:
We agree with the trial court's conclusion [and the Customs Service's posi-
tion] that "all the credible evidence of record conclusively demonstrates
that the products of the Hess refinery are new and different merchandise
from the Alaskan crude oil." It thus seems clear that the "merchandise,"
the language of the statute, transported between Valdez and St. Croix is one
thing, crude oil, while the "merchandise" transported from St. Croix to the
continental United States is a collection of quite different other things, le.,
products which are physically, chemically, and usefully different from the
original crude oil.
37
33 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
34 19 C.F.R. § 4.80b (1988).
35 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
36 Regular, premium and unleaded gasoline; number 2 and number 6 oil; jet fuel; benzene; tolu-
ene; xylene; paraxylene; and sulfur pellets. Id. at 1162
37 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ci-
tations omitted).
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The court further found that the intent of Hess to ship its goods to a
final destination in the United States did not bring the shipment within
the scope of the Jones Act. The degree to which the goods were altered
"in the course of commercial dealings," rather than the intent to ship
them to a final destination in the United States, governed the application
of the Jones Act to the situation in dispute.38
The court's second test for determining whether the intermediate
foreign processing will be sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage
focuses on the cargo owner's reasons for transporting the merchandise to
a foreign intermediate point. In reviewing the legislative purpose under-
lying the 1893 amendments to the predecessor of the Jones Act, the court
concluded that:
No language in the statute indicates that the landing of the cargo in a for-
eign portfor the legitimate purpose of manufacture or processing of the goods
would not convert the goods to other merchandise or would not interrupt
the continuity of the voyage. The words "either directly or via a foreign
port" have reference only to the Keg of Nails situation, i., the simple
transshipment of the same goods in a foreign port, which under the
amended statute does not break the continuity of the voyage.3 9
The Blumenthal Court did not elaborate on the factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether foreign processing is legitimate. It simply
stated the obvious conclusion that Hess's refining operations in St. Croix
were a "far different undertaking from simple transshipment of the same
'merchandise."4 By quoting the Commissioner's initial reply to the
Shipbuilders Council, however, the court did include a thorough discus-
sion of the relevant factors in its decision. If the main purpose for trans-
porting goods from the United States to the foreign point is to have them
processed, the processing is legitimate, and sufficient to break the con-
tinuity of a voyage between the United States origin and ultimate United
States destination. Conversely, under this test, which will be referred to
as the "Main Purpose Test," if processing at a foreign intermediate point
is incidental to intended transportation between two U.S. points, it will
38 Id. at 1164. Thus, the intent to ship a portion of the merchandise to the United States is not
relevant to a determination of whether foreign intermediate processing creates a new and different
product. The shipper's intent to eventually ship merchandise which is not processed in the interme-
diate foreign country to the United States is highly relevant, however, to the issue of whether the
continuity of a voyage is broken by the entry of the merchandise into the commerce or common
stock of a foreign intermediate country. Indeed, that intent will maintain the continuity of the voy-
age when it would otherwise be broken by the entry of the merchandise into the commerce or com-
mon stock of the intermediate foreign country. See, T.D. 79-193, 13 Customs BulL 573, 576 (1979);
34 Op. Atty. Gen. 355 (1924).
39 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
40 Id.
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not break the continuity of the voyage.41
The tests established by the Blumenthal case address the relevant
issues from two different perspectives.
The Main Purpose Test analyzes the processing operation in ques-
tion from the perspective of the legislative purpose underlying the Jones
Act; in essence, whether the main purpose for transporting the merchan-
dise to a foreign location is to process it, or to avoid (or evade) the re-
quirement to use high-cost United States coastwise-qualified vessels.
The Physical Alteration Test, by contrast, focuses on a single key
term in the Act to determine whether the "merchandise" transported
from the United States origin to the foreign processing point is the same
"merchandise" that is transported from the foreign point to the United
States destination.
It appears that the Blumenthal court recognized the limitations of
the Physical Alteration Test. Although it affirmed the Customs Service's
determination that the refining process created products that were physi-
cally, chemically and usefully different from crude oil, it declined to es-
tablish general principles for determining the point on the spectrum of
possible changes of a product at which a new and different product will
be created.42 And, it took pains to discuss the Main Purpose Test, when
it could have merely affirmed the Customs Service's decision under the
Physical Alteration Test.
C. Post-Blumenthal Decisions, Rulings and Opinions
In the ten years since the Blumenthal decision was issued, however,
the Customs Service has concentrated exclusively on the Physical Altera-
tion Test, and ignored the Main Purpose Test. In the process, it entered
a thicket of technical legal and factual issues and lost sight of the purpose
of the Jones Act.
The Customs Service's disparate treatment of the oil and seafood
industries - the two industries that have most often sought Jones Act
41 Although the "Main Purpose Test" as articulated by the Commissioner of Customs in his
initial reply to the Shipbuilders' Council relies upon objective criteria (whether the processing is
substantial, changed the merchandise physically, improved its condition or advanced its value), that
objective criteria is evidence of a subjective state of mind - the shipper's motivation for transporting
the merchandise to the foreign intermediate point. Infra. at 607-08; American Maritime Association
v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The intent of the cargo owner in transporting
merchandise to the foreign intermediate point (for legitimate processing or as a ruse to avoid the
requirement for using coastwise-qualified vessels) should not be confused with his intent that part of
the merchandise be transported to the United States after processing. The former intent is a critical
factor in the "Main Purpose Test," while the latter intent is irrelevant under this test. Infra. at 609,
n. 38; See also, C.S.D. 80-46, 14 Customs Bull 801, 803 (1979).
42 American Maritime Association v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1163, n. 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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rulings on breakages in the continuity of voyages over the past decade -
demonstrates the divergence between the purpose of the coastwise trad-
ing restrictions and current administrative policy.
The oil industry has been the primary beneficiary of the Customs
Service's pattern of relying exclusively on the Physical Alteration Test to
determine whether foreign processing will break the continuity of a voy-
age, while ignoring the Main Purpose Test.
Since 1979, the Customs Service has had the opportunity to consider
a number of points on the spectrum of oil processing operations involv-
ing processing operations that were less extensive than the refining opera-
tions in BlumenthaL The Customs Service's case-by-case decision
making process has led to its current conclusion that new and different
products can be created merely by intermingling different grades of crude
oil at a foreign storage facility. Since the blended crude oil will have a
different sulfur content, pour point, specific gravity and viscosity than the
crude oil transported to the foreign storage point by any particular
tanker, the Customs Service has ruled that blending crude oils in a for-
eign storage tank physically changes the crude to the extent necessary to
create a new and different product, thereby breaking the continuity of the
voyages in question.43 In one of its latest rulings on the issue, for exam-
ple, the Customs Service ruled that the process of blending one tanker
load of crude oil with a 1.3% sulfur content and a second tanker load of
crude oil with a .7% sulfur content created a new and different product
with a sulfur content of 1.0%. 4
The Customs Service's oil processing rulings have had a significant
economic impact on both the oil industry and the United States tanker
industry. The oil industry has saved millions of dollars by substituting
lower-cost foreign flag tankers for United States coastwise-qualified ves-
sels; while the United States tanker fleet - much of which was built to
transport North Slope crude - has encountered severe financial
difficulties.45
The United States seafood industry has not fared nearly as well
when it has sought to use United States non-coastwise-qualifled or for-
eign flag vessels to transport its products to or from foreign processing
plants.
43 Customs Service Ruling No. 105804 (11/16/82); Ruling No. 107071 (10/19/84); Ruling No.
107262 (12/21/84); Ruling No. 107880 (9/6/85); Ruling No. 107912 (9/30/85); Ruling No. 108223
(3/13/86); Ruling No. 108246 (3/19/86).
44 Customs Service Ruling No. 108827 (2/23/87).
45 See Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1982) for
a discussion of the shortage of employment opportunities in the coastwise trades for unsubsidized
U.S. built tankers.
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In 1980, the Customs Service considered the application of the Jones
Act to an operation involving the proposed transportation of King Crab
from the Bering Sea to Vancouver, B.C., where it was to be processed
before being shipped to Seattle. The processing involved cutting crab
clusters (Le., half of a crab with legs and claws attached) into individual
legs or claws (with the body trimmed off). The Customs Service ruled
that the processing would not create a new and different product, because
it consisted "essentially of cutting the crabs into smaller parts and would
transform them into products which would have slight physical but no
chemical or useful differences from their original form."'
Some processed seafood products have passed the Physical Altera-
tion Test. In Customs Service Decision 82-45, the agency advised that
the removal of crab meat from its shell and its subsequent sorting, cook-
ing, canning and packing at a Canadian canning plant would create a
new and different product. In reaching that conclusion, the Customs
Service indicated that the fact that frozen and canned crabmeat are listed
under different customs duty classifications, and are subjected to different
rates of duty, supports the conclusion that new and different products
would be created in that processing operation.47 In that same ruling,
however, the Customs Service ruled that the cleaning, trimming, sorting,
segmenting, glazing and packing of frozen crab parts would not create
new and different products sufficient to break the continuity of the coast-
wise voyage.48
Subsequent requests for Jones Act rulings from seafood processors
introduced a new factual pattern. As in previous rulings, frozen bulk
crab was to be cleaned, cut into crab legs and other finished portions,
glazed and frozen at foreign processing plants. In these situations, how-
ever, the foreign plants were located in Japan and Korea, far removed
from normal coastwise routes between Alaska and the continental
United States. Again, however, by focusing exclusively on the physical
characteristics of the crab before and after processing, the Customs Ser-
vice concluded that a new and different product had not been created,
and that the continuity of the coastwise voyage had not been broken by
the foreign processing.'
In its most recent ruling on the issue of whether the processing of
seafood in a foreign plant would break the continuity of a coastwise voy-
46 Customs Service Ruling No. 104859 at 2 (9/12/80); Ruling No. 104955 (12/2/80); accord
Ruling No. 105319(2/5/81).
47 C.S.D. 82-45, 16 Customs Bull 751 (1981).
48 Id.
49 Customs Service Ruling No. 106093 (6/7/83); Customs Service Ruling No. 108294 (4/18/
86).
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age, the Customs Service subjected a number of processed crab products
to the Physical Alteration Test. In this case, frozen ocean run bulk crab
were to be transported to a Korean processing plant. Initially the Ko-
rean processor would: thaw, or partially thaw, and clean the frozen crab;
remove all traces of the seawater glaze; remove any broken pieces of
shell, impurities, or foreign matter; trim off any body parts remaining
after the initial processing in Alaska; remove blood, internal organs and
gills; and grade the crab arms, legs and claws.
Depending on the grade and condition of the crab parts, the Korean
processor would then process the crab into: a variety of crab legs and
claws (some of which were scored with parallel cuts to enable them to be
broken without crab cracking tools); cocktail claws (with most of the
shell removed); and extracted crab meat. Those products would then be
glazed with fresh water, frozen and packed into packages of convenient
size for the restaurant industry.5"
The Customs Service concluded that the crab legs and claws that
were shipped from the processing plant in Korea to restaurants in the
United States were not different enough from the bulk crab shipped from
Alaska to Korea to constitute a new and different product, sufficient to
break the continuity of the coastwise voyage. The cocktail claws and
extracted meat products were different enough, however, to warrant a
ruling that they were new and different products - in part, because they
would be classified under a different tariff classification than bulk crab.51
III. ANALYSIS
A. Divergence between Customs Service Rulings and the Legislative
Purpose of the Jones Act
In comparing any specific Customs Service ruling issued since the
Blumenthal case with the precedent established by previous rulings on
processing operations in the same industry, no obvious lapses in its logic
will be detected. If refining creates products that are physically, chemi-
cally and usefully different from crude oil, it does not require a quantum
leap of logic to conclude that a mixture of two tanker loads of crude oil
creates a blended product that is physically, chemically and perhaps use-
fully different from either of the initial tanker loads. Applying the oil
processing precedent to the seafood industry, it is not illogical to con-
clude that restaurant or consumer-grade products that are created at
processing plants are not chemically different from the seafood shipped
50 Customs Ruling No. 109504 at 2 (8/12/88).
51 Id. at 10.
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to the processing plant, and that their physical appearances are some-
what similar. Moreover, once the precedent is established that new and
different products are not created in relatively simple seafood processing
operations, it is difficult to pinpoint the specific incremental point at
which the processing operation will be sufficient to create new and differ-
ent products.
Ten years after the issuance of the Blumenthal decision, however, it
is appropriate to shift consideration from specific Customs Service rul-
ings to the broader question of whether the Service is administering the
Jones Act in reasonable conformity with the Act's legislative purpose.
In a number of its foreign processing rulings, the Customs Service's
employment of the Physical Alteration Test has allowed oil companies to
substitute foreign-flag vessels for United States coastwise-qualified vessels
that are ready, willing and able to provide the service (albeit at a higher
cost). It is now possible for the oil industry to avoid the requirement of
using United States coastwise-qualified vessels by expedients as simple as:
- dispatching two tankers with loads of different grades of crude
oil from Alaska to an ultimate destination on the United States;
- stopping virtually enroute to offload their cargoes at Caribbean
storage tanks;
- waiting until the two grades of crude oil become intermingled in
the Caribbean storage tanks;
- reloading the blended crude into the tankers; and
- delivering the blended crude to the intended U.S. Gulf Coast
destination.
It is difficult to construct respectable argument that the main pur-
pose for offloading oil in the above-mentioned situation is to process it
into a new and different product. It is equally difficult to demonstrate
that such processing was substantial, rather than incidental. The cargo
owner's motive appears transparent; he seeks to offload the cargoes in the
Caribbean for the sole purpose of avoiding the coastwise restrictions of
the Jones Act.
Yet, the Customs Service's exclusive reliance on the Physical Altera-
tion Test, and its concomitant rejection of the Main Purpose Test, per-
mits such evasions of the Jones Act, and idles tankers that were built in
the United States (without subsidy) to carry that traffic.
In a number of seafood processing rulings, however, the Customs
Service has swung the balance sharply away from the interests of cargo
owners. The same fascination with the Physical Alteration Test has led
it to conclude that the coastwise trade extends to the exportation of prod-
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ucts to foreign processing sites (where it is apparent that the cargo
owner's main purpose is to process the merchandise and not to evade the
Jones Act) because the processing operation would not produce a suffi-
cient chemical or physical change in the merchandise.
In many of those situations, the sharp swing in the balance away
from cargo owners does not even produce a compensating benefit to the
U.S. merchant marine. Since the coastwise-qualified fleet (particularly
liner vessels that operate fixed routes between U.S. ports) provides serv-
ices in the domestic trades where it is insulated from competition with
lower-cost foreign vessels, no coastwise-qualified vessels are available to
transport cargoes between U.S. and foreign points located any substantial
distance from those domestic routes (such as the Japanese and Korean
processing sites considered in Ruling Nos. 106093, 108294 and 109504).
In short, the Customs Service's rulings in the oil and seafood indus-
tries are inversely related to the purposes of the Jones Act. When the
coastwise tanker fleet stands ready, willing and able to carry crude oil
between U.S. points, the Customs Service allows the oil companies to
avoid the Jones Act's coastwise restrictions by engaging in inconsequen-
tial processing operations virtually enroute between those U.S. points.
But, when the coastwise liner fleet has no ability to carry seafood to for-
eign locations far removed from their domestic routes, the Customs Ser-
vice rules that substantial processing operations at those foreign sites will
not break the continuity of the voyage between the U.S. origin and the
ultimate U.S. destinations.
B. Relationship between the Physical Alteration and the Main
Purpose Tests
Recognizing the divergence between the Customs Service's adminis-
tration of the Jones Act and the Act's Congressional purpose is only half
the battle. The other half is to bring the Custom Service's administration
of the Jones Act into compliance with the purposes of the legislation,
while adhering to the Blumenthal decision.
The Customs Service lost sight of the purpose of the Jones Act (and
a substantial portion of the Blumenthal decision) when it relied exclu-
sively on the Physical Alteration Test and ignored the Main Purpose
Test. Three other possibilities remain: rely exclusively on the Main Pur-
pose Test and ignore the Physical Alteration Test; conclude that the con-
tinuity of a voyage will be broken if either test is met; or consider both
tests in conjunction with each other.
Policy considerations might support the substitution of the Main
Purpose Test for the Physical Alteration Test as the sole basis for deter-
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mining whether foreign processing will break the continuity of a voyage.
Certainly, rulings based upon this test would be more compatible with
the purposes of the Jones Act than the rulings issued by the Customs
Service over the past decade. But, unless Congress legislatively overrules
Blumenthal, the Physical Alteration Test cannot be eliminated. Thus,
neither test can be disregarded completely.
It is not necessary, however, to make an exclusive choice between
either of the remaining possibilities (treating the two tests as alternatives
or considering them in conjunction with each other). As noted below,
either test can be applied with little or no reference to the other in ex-
treme situations. In most situations, however, the two tests should be
applied in conjunction with each other.
1. Province of the Physical Alteration Test
At one extreme, cargo owners must be allowed to qualify their for-
eign processing operations under the Physical Alteration Test for the
most technical of reasons. Since non-coastwise-qualified vessels are pro-
hibited from transporting "merchandise" between coastwise points, the
continuity of a voyage must be considered to be broken if different mer-
chandise is carried to and from the intermediate foreign processing point.
But, the Customs Service should not create any more technical excep-
tions to the Jones Act than are necessary to fulfill the requirements of the
Blumenthal precedent. Thus, if the processing in question produces any
less physical alteration of the merchandise than was found to exist in the
Blumenthal case, the Service should conclude that the processing does
not break the continuity of the voyage on the basis of the Physical Alter-
ation Test alone.
2. Province of the Main Purpose Test
At the other extreme, the Customs Service should conclude that a
new and different product sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage
in question is produced whenever the cargo owner conclusively demon-
strates that the main purpose for transporting his merchandise to a for-
eign point is to have it processed, rather than to avoid the coastwise
restrictions of the Jones Act.
Although intent is often difficult to prove, in some situations com-
pelling proof will be available. Cargo owners attempt to avoid the coast-
wise restrictions of the Jones Act for one reason, to substitute lower-cost
foreign flag or United States non-coastwise-qualified vessels for United
States coastwise-qualifled vessels. A cargo owner should be able to make
aprimafacia case for his contention that the main purpose of the expor-
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tation is to have the merchandise processed at the foreign point, rather
than to avoid the coastwise restrictions of the Jones Act, if he can
demonstrate that the proposed non-coastwise-qualified carriers' freight
charges (Le., the cost of transporting the product from the United States
origin to the intermediate foreign point, plus the cost of transporting it
from that intermediate point to the United States destination) would ex-
ceed the prevailing coastwise-qualified carriers' rates for transporting the
product directly between the United States origin and destination.
Moreover, the freight charges paid to non-coastwise-qualified vessel
operators for transporting cargoes between two United States points via a
foreign point normally will exceed the charges paid to coastwise-qualified
vessels for transportation directly between those points only if the foreign
intermediate point is located relatively far from the direct route between
those points (iLe., the greater mileage on the indirect route more than
makes up for the higher per mile cost on the shorter direct route). In
that situation, not only is the shipper motivated by legitimate processing
rather than transportation factors, but coastwise-qualified vessels will not
be in a position to carry the traffic even if it were reserved for that seg-
ment of the fleet.5 2
3. Combination of Both Tests
The difficult cases, of course, lie between these extremes where
neither test can be applied without reference to each other. If the physi-
cal alteration of the merchandise is less extensive than in the Blumenthal
case, and the non-coastwise-qualified carriers' freight charges via the in-
direct route are less than coastwise-qualified carrier's charges via the di-
rect route, neither test by itself is conclusive.
Ironically, sound criteria for determining whether foreign process-
ing will create a new and different product in light of all relevant circum-
stances can be found in Jones Act rulings that the Customs Service issued
before the Blumenthal decision, but overlooked after it focused solely on
Physical Alteration Test. Other relevant factors can be derived from its
rulings on analogous customs issues.
In a 1964 Treasury Decision, for example, it was proposed that bulk
rice would be transported from California to a processing plant in the
Virgin Islands where: it would be fumigated, brushed and polished; dust,
small particles, broken kernels, lumps, foreign matter and impurities
would be removed; and glucose, tale and minerals would be added. After
52 Even at this extreme, the Main Purpose Test would be subject to the Jones Act requirement
that the continuity of a voyage would not be broken by mere transshipment at an intermediate
foreign port as in the 250 Kegs of Nails situation.
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the processing, the rice would be shipped to Puerto Rico (a coastwise
point for purposes of the Jones Act).53 The Customs Service concluded
that the processing operation created a new and different product, and
thereby broke the continuity of the voyage, because:
- the product would be "changed physically;"
- the product would be "improved in condition;"
- the product would be "advanced in value;" and
- the processing would be of a "substantial and not merely inci-
dental nature."54
The degree of physical change in this case was not determined by a
chemist's test of molecular composition or a physicist's test of specific
gravity. Instead, the Customs Service concluded that this product would
be physically changed by applying commercial considerations - the
physical changes accomplished by cleaning, polishing and fortifying the
rice required in order it to sell it in retail markets.
Another ruling that same year illustrates the same point. In this case
logs were to be milled into rough cut lumber (generally, the largest rec-
tangular section available from each log) in the United States; the rough
cut lumber was to be shipped to a Canadian lumber mill; the rough cut
lumber was to be planed, trimmed, graded and packaged in the Canadian
lumber mill; and eventually a substantial portion of the finished lumber
products was to be shipped back to the United States.55 The Customs
Service ruled that when the rough cut lumber was processed into finished
lumber in Canada a new and different product was created.56
Again, this processing operation would produce no significant
changes in the chemical composition or specific gravity of the product in
question. Each piece of finished lumber would have virtually the same
chemical composition and specific gravity as the rough cut lumber from
which it was cut. But, the physical changes created by turning a piece of
rough cut lumber into two-by-fours are necessary to transform semi-
processed goods into merchandise suitable for sale to consumers.
The Blumenthal Court found that refined products have a different
chemical composition and specific gravity than crude oil. However,
these are industry-specific factors that provide no useful guidance for
processing operations of other industries. An interpretation of greater
53 Treas. Dec. 56272(2) at 1,2 (7/6/64).
54 Id. These factors were later incorporated into the Main Purpose Test that the Commissioner
relied upon in his initial response to the Shipbuilders Council. American Maritime Association v.
Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55 Treas. Dec. 56320(2) (8/6/64); accord Customs Service Ruling No. 108520 (8/25/86).
56 Treas. Dec. 56320(2) (8/6/64).
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significance is that changes in the product enable the oil companies to
transform its raw material into consumer products.
Thus, the crucial factor to be considered in determining whether the
processing in question creates a "physical change" is whether the change
has a commercial significance. Changes of commercial significance
which will tend to demonstrate that the processing has created a new and
different product for purposes of the Jones Act ordinarily will include
operations that:
- transform unprocessed or semi-processed products that are not
saleable in a particular market into products that can be sold in
that market; V
- enable the owner to sell the product at a different level in the
distribution chain; or
- change the product's customs duty classification upon entry into
the United States.
Conversely, if the processing operation alters the appearance of the prod-
uct, changes its specific gravity or alters its chemical composition with-
out affecting its commercial character, the physical change should be
irrelevant for purposes of the Jones Act.
The "improvement in condition" criterion also involves commercial
considerations. For example, in the Customs Service's rice and lumber
rulings, as well as the court's Blumenthal decision, the improvements in
the condition of the products were substantial because they transformed
raw or semi-processed products which would not have been saleable to
consumers into consumer products.
The "advancement in value" criterion is particularly relevant to the
underlying purpose of the Jones Act. Even if a foreign processing opera-
tion does not turn raw or semi-processed goods into consumer merchan-
dise, if that processing adds substantial value to the product, it becomes
more likely that the exportation of the product to the foreign processing
site was to have it processed rather than to avoid the coastwise restric-
tions of the Jones Act.
Likewise, determining whether the processing was of a "substantial
and not merely an incidental nature" forces the fact-finder to consider
the degree of change in the product with reference to the motives of the
cargo owner and the purposes of the Jones Act. The more substantial the
change in the product, the less likely that the cargo owner has arranged
for incidental foreign processing as a means of breaking the continuity of
a coastwise voyage rather than to allow him to use lower-cost non-coast-
wise-qualified vessels.
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4. Consistency with Related and Analogous Customs Service Rulings
and Decisions
Finally, the determination of whether foreign processing creates a
new and different product for purposes of the Jones Act should be consis-
tent with the Customs Service's rulings on related issues; in particular, its
rulings on the issue of whether the foreign processing creates a product
that must be identified as a product of that foreign country for purposes
of the country-of-origin marking requirements of the Tariff Act of
1930.17 The primary purpose of the country-of-origin marking statute is
summarized in United States v. Friedlander"8 :
Congress intended that the ultimate purchaser should be able to know by
an inspection of the marking on imported goods the country of which the
goods is the product. The evident purpose is to mark the goods so that at
the time of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the
goods were produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking
should influence his will.59
When further work or material is added to an article in another country
that would effect a "substantial transformation" of the article, the coun-
try in which that transformation occurs will be the country-of-origin for
purposes of the statute.
66
A substantial transformation occurs for purposes of the country-of-
origin marking statute when the goods shipped to the foreign processing
operation "lose their identity as such, and become new articles having...
a new name, character, and use. .. ."I Other tests that have been ap-
plied by courts or the Customs Service to determine whether a product
has been substantially transformed so as to become a product of the
county in which it is processed include the "article of commerce" tests,
which focuses on whether a new article of commerce has emerged from
the processing operation, and the "value added" test, which provides that
substantial transformation occurs if the foreign processing contributes
significantly to the value of the final product.62
The tests used by the Customs Service in determining whether a
product has been substantially transformed for purposes of the country-
of-origin marking statute are virtually identical in purpose to the tests
57 Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 304, 304(a) 19 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1304(a) (1987).
58 27 CCPA 297 (1940).
59 Id. at 302.
60 Id.
61 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1907); United
States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., 27 CCPA 267, 273 (1940); 19 C.F.R. § 134.35 (1987).
62 Koru North America v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 234 n. 9 (C.I.T. 1988); United States
v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163 (lst Cir. 1980), cert den'd 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
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that the Service used for considering whether new and different products
were created for purposes of the Jones Act before the Customs Service
focused exclusively on the Physical Alteration Test. For a country-of-
origin determination, the Customs Service compares the merchandise
before and after processing to determine whether an article having a new
name, character and use is created; whether a different article of com-
merce is produced; and whether the operation adds substantial value to
the product. For a Jones Act determination, the Custom Service should
compare the merchandise before and after processing to determine
whether the product is changed physically and usefully; whether it is
improved in condition; whether it is advanced in value; whether the
processing was of a substantial and not merely an incidental nature; and
whether the main purpose of the exportation was to have the merchan-
dise processed, rather than to avoid the coastwise restrictions of the
Jones Act.
The similarity between these tests is not coincidental. Products
originating in the United States must be marked as foreign-origin mer-
chandise if they are substantially transformed at an intermediate foreign
processing site enroute from the United States origin to the United States
destination. If foreign processing is substantial enough to change an un-
processed or semi-processed United States origin product into a
processed foreign product for purposes of the country-of-origin marking
statute, it stands to reason for the purposes of the Jones Act that one type
of product was shipped to the intermediate foreign point and a new and
different product was shipped from that point to the United States.
Although logic indicates that there should be at least a rough paral-
lel between the Jones Act and country-of-origin marking decisions, in
fact, many are diametrically opposed.
For example, in National Juice Products Association v. United
States63 the Customs Service ruled that foreign origin orange juice con-
centrate was not substantially transformed in a United States processing
operation in which it was blended with water, orange essences, orange oil
and fresh juices; packaged in cans or cartons; and frozen or chilled. On
review, the Court of International Trade affirmed the Customs Service's
ruling.
64
In United States v. Murray,65 the court of appeals affirmed the con-
viction of an importer for conspiracy to knowingly and willfully import
glue into the United States by means of false statements. His crime was
63 628 F. Supp. 978 (C.I.T. 1986).
64 Id. at 991.
65 621 F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1980).
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to purchase Chinese glue, blend it with Dutch glue in Rotterdam and
import it into the United States marked as a product of the
Netherlands.66
In both country-of-origin marking cases, the primary reason for re-
jecting the arguments that the products were substantially transformed
in the blending operations in question was that they did not increase the
value of the product significantly (an increase of less than 8% in the
orange juice case and a negligible increase in the glue case).67 Yet, in its
Jones Act rulings, the Customs Service has ruled that new and different
products are created when oil companies blend different grades of crude
oil, whether or not the blending process adds any value to the crude oil.
In its Jones Act rulings, the Customs Service ruled that new and
different products are created through the blending of different grades of
crude oil, because the blended product has a different specific gravity,
sulfur content, viscosity and pour point than any of the original grades.
Yet, the virtual certainty that orange juice and glue experience a change
in specific gravity, pour point and viscosity during blending operations
did not convince the Customs Service or courts to find that substantial
transformations of those products occurred in the country-of-origin
marking cases.
A major discrepancy between Jones Act and country-of-origin
marking rulings also exists in the seafood industry. In Koru North
America v. United States,6" fish caught in the New Zealand Exclusive
Economic Zone were beheaded, de-tailed, eviscerated and frozen in New
Zealand; shipped to South Korea; thawed, skinned, boned, trimmed,
glazed, refrozen and repackaged in the South Korean processing plant;
and exported to the United States.69 The court found that the products
should be marked as products of South Korea because the name was
changed (from "headed and gutted Hoki" to "individual quick-frozen
fillets"); the fish's character was changed (from whole, albeit headless
and tailless, fish to fish fillets packaged for retail sale); the fillets were
considered discrete commercial goods, sold in separate areas and mar-
kets; and the headed and gutted fish underwent a transformation into a
processed retail product in Korea.7"
Allowing for the physical differences between fish and crabs, virtu-
66 Id.
67 National Juice Products Association v. United States, 628 F.Supp. 978, 991 (C.I.T. 1986);
United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1171 (1st Cir. 1980).
68 701 F.Supp. 229 (C.I.T. 1988).
69 Id. at 230.
70 Id. at 235.
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ally identical changes occurred in the Koru case and the crab rulings.
7 1
In the country-of-origin marking case a substantial transformation oc-
curred in the Korean fish processing plant, while in the Jones Act rulings
new and different products did not emerge from the Japanese and Ko-
rean crab processing plants.
Consistency between the Customs Service's Jones Act and country-
of-origin marking rulings should be achieved by utilizing the full panoply
of relevant criteria that it presently employs in its country-of-origin
marking cases, and recognized in its Jones Act rulings before the Cus-
toms Service focused exclusively on the Physical Alteration Test.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Jones Act was enacted to provide a limited degree of protec-
tionism to a specific industry, i.e to reserve domestic maritime trades to
United States coastwise-qualified vessels. Properly interpreted and ad-
ministered, it can promote the objective of assuring the availability of
United States built and crewed vessels. Moreover, that protection to the
coastwise fleet can be provided without unduly restricting the ability of
United States producers to compete in the global market by processing
their products wherever the most efficient processing industries happen
to be located.
The Customs Service, however, has interpreted. the Jones Act in
such a way that some industries can substitute lower-cost non-coastwise-
qualified vessels for available coastwise-qualified vessels by engaging in
incidental processing at intermediate foreign processing points virtually
enroute between United States ports of origin and destination. At the
same time, other industries are restricted to the use of non-existent coast-
wise-qualified vessels to transport their products to foreign processing
facilities located thousands of miles from the nearest domestic maritime
route.
It is within the Customs Service's power to conform its interpreta-
tions to the purpose of the Jones Act. Within the parameters of binding
court decisions (and the rulings that it issued before it focused exclusively
on the Physical Alteration Test), the Customs Service can:
- limit the Physical Alteration Test to situations involving trans-
formations through foreign processing at least as extensive as
found in Blumenthal;
- apply the Main Purpose Test whenever compelling proof is pro-
vided to demonstrate that the cargo owner's motivation for
71 Customs Service Rulings No. 106093, No. 108294 and No. 109504; infra at 16, 17.
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transporting his product to the foreign intermediate point is to
have it processed, rather than to avoid the coastwise restrictions
of the Jones Act (normally by showing that the non-coastwise-
qualified carriers' freight charges via the indirect route are
greater than coastwise c arriers' prevailing freight rates via the
direct route); and
- in all other situations, determine whether a new and different
product has been created with reference to valid commercial fac-
tors (Le., changes in physical composition that enable the prod-
uct to be sold in different markets, at different levels in the
distribution chain or under different customs duty classifications;
improvements in the condition of the product; advancements in
the value of the product; and other substantial transformations).
If the Customs Service applied these criteria to future ruling re-
quests and penalty proceedings, however, it certainly would have to re-
verse some of its post-Blumenthal rulings.
The rulings holding that oil blending operations virtually enroute
between United States ports of origin and destination created new and
different products clearly could not be upheld under the Physical Altera-
tion Test (if it were limited to processing at least as extensive as that
found in Blumenthal), the Main Purpose Test or any combination of
relevant commercial factors. Such incidental processing would fall far
short of creating new and different products sufficient to break the con-
tinuity of coastwise voyages. On the other hand, the Korean and Japa-
nese seafood processing cases clearly would create new and different
products under the Main Purpose Test. Since the total freight charges
(for transporting bulk seafood from Alaska to South Korean or Japanese
processing facilities and processed seafood products from those facilities
to United States West Coast ports) via non-coastwise-qualified vessels is
substantially greater than the cost of transporting bulk seafood directly
from Alaska to United States West Coast ports via coastwise-qualified
vessels, it would be clear that the main purpose of the exportation was to
have the product processed rather than to avoid the use of higher-cost
United States coastwise-qualified vessels.
As advisory opinions, those rulings merely estop the Customs Ser-
vice from adopting a contrary interpretation of the Jones Act with re-
spect to the person who obtained the ruling, and provide some guidance
to other interested parties on the anticipated response that they would
obtain if they requested advisory opinions concerning their proposed
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transactions.72
As a matter of fairness, the Customs Service need only provide ade-
quate notice of its departure from previous rulings. This could be accom-
plished through inclusion of rulings adopting the suggested criteria in the
Customs Bulletin and Decisions, or the publication of an appropriate no-
tice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.
As a matter of law and policy, the Customs Service should adopt
criteria that promote the legislative policy of reserving domestic mari-
time trades to coastwise-qualified vessels, without requiring producers to
use nonexistent coastwise-qualified vessels in foreign maritime trades be-
tween the United States and foreign processing facilities, or unduly re-
stricting their opportunity to compete in the global economy by
processing their products wherever the most efficient facilities may be
located.
72 19 CF.R. § 177.9 (b) (4) and (c) (1988).
